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The Sherman Law Firm

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Bear Stearns Briefs (Key Points excerpted from blogs and periodicals)

No.1 - LIQUIDITY CRISIS:  Before March 10, 2008; pace of the plunging value of mortgage-backed securities had increased, leaving Bear with fewer real assets and, therefore, insufficient collateral to secure the repo financing it needed for daily operations. Excerpt, below, from Stanton Champion website, Bear Stearns Meltdown, March 18, 2008.

"Bear's real problem was a lack of faith in their assets: mortgage securities. Over the past several weeks, the markets for these assets have simply stopped moving, meaning that in many cases buying and selling them is very difficult."

"For Bear Stearns, the problem was simply that some of their creditors wanted repayment on their repos (they wanted their money they had lent to Bear back), but Bear was unable to find enough liquidity in the market using its large portfolio of mortgage securities. In other words, Bear couldn't find enough money through additional repos and nobody would buy their mortgage securities outright. Other creditors, sensing trouble, began piling on and trying to get their money back as well. Since Bear Stearns had $75 billion more borrowed than lent, they were ultimately screwed without extra financing."


No.2 - SUBPRIME DISASTER:  Foreseeability of subprime mortgage collapse. Shortsighted About the Subprime Disaster,  By Jack Guttentag; Excerpt, below, from The Washington PostSaturday, May 26, 2007; Page F02

[T]urmoil in the subprime mortgage market, as I discussed last week. The rise in delinquencies, defaults and foreclosures has been concentrated among appreciation-dependent mortgages -- those that work for borrowers only if their property values increase. A large proportion, but not all, of such mortgages are subprime, meaning they were made to borrowers with imperfect credit or insufficient cash for standard mortgages.

"It's easy to understand why borrowers became caught up in the belief that house prices always rise, but lenders are supposed to know better.


No. 3 - LIQUIDITY CRISIS: "Bear had... a leverage ratio of more than 35 to one. And its assets were less liquid than those of many of its competitors." Excerpts from The last days of Bear Stearns, Fortune Magazine, By Roddy Boyd.

"[B]y March 10, the problem had metastasized into something more dire than a rumor. Late the preceding Friday, a major bank - accounts differ on which - had rebuffed Bear's request for a short-term $2 billion loan...Bear executives scrambled and raised the money elsewhere. But the sign was unmistakable: Credit was drying up."

"However much Bear Stearns saw itself as strengthened by its struggles, customers thought otherwise, and that hastened Bear's fall... Bob Sloan, whose S3 Partners finances and advises hedge funds, says he counseled clients last summer to seek other prime brokers because he saw a '30% to 35% chance' that Bear would collapse."


No. 4 - GROSS MISMANAGEMENT BY EX-CEOJIMMY CAYNE:  Jimmy Cayne, Bear CEO until January 2008, concedes that he reacted like a deer in the headlights to the subprime mortgage problems at Bear Stearns.  Excerpts, below, from Fortune Magazine, Jimmy Cayne, the rise and fall of Bear's ex-CEO, By William D. Cohan.

"But by the summer of 2007 this creature of instinct was out of his element. He did not know how to deal with the devaluation of the firm's mortgage-backed securities and other illiquid assets. Nor did he know what to do after the situation worsened when two hedge funds that contained those same toxic assets collapsed and further poisoned the company's balance sheet. 'That was a period of not seeing the light at the end of the tunnel,' he told Fortune recently. 'It was not knowing what to do. It's not being able to make a definitive decision one way or the other, because I just couldn't tell you what was going to happen.' 

 


No. 5 - SUBPRIME DISASTER: Distilled to its essence, the subprime crisis is about the ability and/or willingness of people with poor credit to pay their home loans on time, month after month after month. 

There are many other factors (predatory lending practices, fraudulent credit ratings, etc.), but the bottom line is that loaning money to people with a history of late bill payments (a fairly common trait with the bad-credit crowd) is a recipe for eventual mortgage defaults. It is no more responsible than if banks hired ex-cons as security guards, or the NY Jets retained Patriots as the Jets official cinematographers.  


 

No. 6 - SUBPRIME DISASTER: AN  IMAGINARY CROSS-EXAMINATION OF RALPH CIOFFI.  Just wondering if Cioffi would come clean under the bright lights of the witness stand..., By Brett Sherman

1) Am I nuts, or did the entire the subprime securities machine hinge on whether an endless stream of borrowers with bad-credit (most of whom presumably do not exactly have a stellar track record when it comes to paying bills on time) kept current on mortgage payments?

2) You didn't honestly believe that your legion of low-credit leopards would change their spots (at least in the long run)? 

3) Didn't you realize that there would be mass defaults among subprime borrowers just as soon as they were faced difficult economic conditions (i.e., rising interest rates, falling home prices)? 

4) If your answers to questions 1-3 were yes, no, and yes, then isn't it true that you committed securities fraud on a truly massive scale? 

-Wait Ralph! Don't answer. Question 4 was rhetorical...

 

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The Sherman Law Firm

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fax: (888) 843-2390